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Abstract. One of the methods used in order to protect a secret K is a secret sharing scheme.
In this scheme the secret K is distributed among a finite set of participants P by a special
participant called the dealer, in such a way that only predefined subsets of participants can
recover the secret after collaborating with their secret shares. The construction of secret shar-
ing schemes has received a considerable attention of many searchers whose main goal was to
improve the information rate. In this paper, we propose a novel construction of a secret sharing
scheme which is based on the hierarchical concept of companies illustrated through its organi-
zation chart and represented by a tree. We proof that the proposed scheme is ideal by showing
that the information rate equals 1. In order to show the efficiency of the proposed scheme, we
discuss all possible kinds of attacks and proof that the security in ensured. Finally, we include
a detailed didactic example for a small company organization chart.
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1. Introduction
The fast development of computer networks and data communication systems make the pro-
tection of secret data extremely imperative. In order to protect a secret, several methods have
been applied before, one of theme is to encrypt data, but this will change the problem instead
of solving it, since another method is required to protect the encrypted data. Its also possible
to keep the secret in one well-guarded location, but this method is very unreliable since the
secret can be destroyed or become inaccessible. Another method consists in sharing the data,
either by storing multiple copies of the data in different locations, which would increase security
vulnerabilities, or by splitting the data into several parts and sharing them between different
members of the system. This last method is called secret sharing scheme and would be very
efficient in case where the reconstruction of the initial data does not require the presence of
all the system members, otherwise the veto given to each member would paralyze the system
[1]. Secret sharing schemes have many applications in different areas, such as access control,
launching a missile, and opening a bank vault. For more details see for instance [16, 15].
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The secret sharing scheme is therefore a method of distributing a secret K among a finite set of
participants P , in such a way that only predefined subsets of participants can collaborate with
their secret shares to recover the secret K. These subsets are called qualified subsets and the set
of all qualified subsets is called the access structure denoted Γ [7]. Each subset of participants
Y ∈ Γ is called a minimal qualified subset if (Y ′ ⊂ Y and Y ′ ∈ Γ) implies Y ′ = Y . The family
of all minimal qualified subsets is noted Γ0. In a secret sharing scheme, the secret K is chosen
by a special participant, called the dealer, who is responsible for computing and distributing the
shares among the set of participants P . The share of any participant refers specifically to the
information that the dealer sends in private. It is required to keep the size of shares as small as
possible since the security of a system degrades as the amount of information that must be kept
secret increases.
Many approaches have been proposed for the construction of a secret sharing scheme [17]. The
first one called (t, n)-threshold scheme was introduced independently by Shamir and Blakley
[1, 5] in 1979. In a (t, n)-threshold scheme, all groups of at least t participants of n-participants
are qualified and can reconstruct the secret, while those with less than t participants are unqual-
ified and can’t have any information about the secret. The scheme proposed by Shamir is based
on polynomials over a finite field GF (q) since a random polynomial f is chosen by the dealer
for computing and distributing the shares among the set of participants P in such a way that,
each participant pi is given an ordered pair (xi, f(xi)) as a share. This scheme still reliable and
secure even when misfortunes destroy half the pieces and security breaches expose all but one
of the remaining pieces. This scheme is perfect, since all qualified subsets can reconstruct the
secret and unqualified subsets cannot determine any information about the secret. The scheme
is called ideal, if xi is publicly revealed so that the share of participant pi becomes just f(xi)
and then the size of each share equals the size of the secret. The scheme proposed by Blakley is
based on geometries over finite fields, it’s perfect and can be modified slightly to become ideal,
as explained by Ernest [7].
Ito et al. have generalized the concept of threshold scheme and showed that, given any monotone
access structure Γ, i.e., for Y ∈ Γ, if Y ⊂ Y ′ then Y ′ ∈ Γ, there exist a perfect secret sharing
scheme to realize the structure [10, 9]. Benaloh and Leichter proposed a different algorithm
that has a lower information rate than Ito’s et al. construction [11]. In both constructions, the
information rate decreases exponentially as a function of the number of participants n = |P |.
The information rate, noted ρ, is considered as a measure of the efficiency of a secret sharing
scheme. It is defined as the ratio between the secret size and the maximum size of the shares S,
that is, ρ = log2(|K|)log
2
(|S|) [7]. Other measures can also be considered such as the average information
rate, which is defined as the ratio between the length of the secret and the arithmetic mean of
the length of all shares and expressed as follow ρ˜ = n log2(|K|)∑n
i=1 log2(|Si|)
[12].
Another approach based on the multilevel access structures was presented by Simmons in 1988.
In this approach each participant is assigned a level which is a positive integer and the access
structure consists of those subsets which contain at least r participants all of level at most r.
That means for instance if r = 3, then 3 participants of level 3 can determine the secret, and
also 1 participant of level 1 and one other participant of level 2 and one participant of level 3
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can determine the secret, for more details see for instance [8]. In [7] Brickell shown that given
any multilevel access structure, there exists q0 such that for any q a prime power with q > q0,
there is an ideal secret sharing scheme realizing this access structure over GF (q).
There are also another approaches based on graph access structure that have received a con-
siderable attention. In the most of these approaches, many researchers have proposed differ-
ent constructions of a perfect secret sharing scheme based on uniform access structures which
contains qualified subsets all of the same cardinality m. In these constructions, participants
are represented by the vertices of a graph G, the uniform access structure Γ is based on the
concept of adjacent vertices and represented by the edges, for more details see for instance
[4, 18, 3, 14, 6, 13]. In [2] a novel approach to design a graph access structure, which is based
on the concept of non-adjacent vertices, was proposed. In this approach, an independent dom-
inating set of vertices in a graph G was introduced and applied as a novel idea to construct a
perfect secret sharing scheme such that the vertices of the graph represent the participants and
the dominating set of vertices in G represents the minimal qualified set.
2. The proposed construction algorithm
Shamir [1] had specified that one of the useful properties of the proposed threshold scheme
is that by using tuples of polynomial values as parts, it is possible to get a hierarchical scheme
in which the number of parts needed to determine the secret depends on the importance of the
participants. He also brought a brief explanation based on an example of a company’s check
signature. The motivation of this paper is to propose a novel construction algorithm of an ideal
secret sharing scheme which is based on the hierarchical concept of companies and in which the
access structure is not uniform.The proposed construction algorithm include two phases which
are achieved by the dealer who can, for instance, be represented by the board of directors (BOD)
at a company.
2.1. The initialization phase. The hierarchical concept of any company is illustrated through
its organization chart which is represented by a tree T = (V,E) such that:
• The height of T corresponds to the number of hierarchical levels at the company, denoted
h, and each hierarchical level is denoted Nj, for j = 1, . . . , h.
• The set of vertices V corresponding to the company’s employees represents the set of par-
ticipants P . As each participant i belong to a specified level j, we denote by Pij such
participant.
• The set of edges E corresponds to the hierarchical relations between participants (employ-
ees).
Figure 1 given bellow, illustrates an organization chart of a company with 9 employees and 3
hierarchical levels.
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Figure 1. Company organization chart T with 9 employees.
In the initialization phase, the dealer proceed to the construction of the access structure Γ
containing all the qualified subsets. A subset X of P is considered as qualified if and only if:
(i) X contains more than one participant. No participant will have the veto right for recon-
structing the secret alone, especially the first manager. This condition is formulated by:
∑
Pij∈X
j ≥ h+ 1.
(ii) The elements of X cannot all be at the same hierarchical level, in order to reduce the risk
of corruption. This condition is expressed by:
|X ∩Nj| ≤
⌈
h+ 1
j
⌉
− 1, for j = 1, . . . , h.
The access structure Γ is then:
Γ =

X ⊂ P :
∑
Pij∈X
j ≥ h+ 1 and |X ∩Nj | ≤
⌈
h+ 1
j
⌉
− 1, for j = 1, . . . , h

 .
The minimum access structure Γ0 is then Γ0 = {X ∈ Γ : ∀X
′(X ′  X ⇒ X ′ 6∈ Γ)}.
2.2. The decomposition phase. In this phase, the dealer:
• Choose a prime power number q;
• Select the secret to share K = (k1, . . . , kh) that he encodes in the finite field GF (q);
• Generate randomly one value a0 in GF (q);
• Construct the polynomial f(x) of degree h:
f(x) = a0 + k1x+ · · ·+ khx
h;
• Calculate and distribute the shares to all participants. The share given to each participant
Pij , denoted Sij, consists on two parts. The first one is publicly revealed and correspond
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to there login i and hierarchical level j. The second part is sent in private and consists on
j values of ordered pairs (xi1, f(xi1)) , . . . , (xij , f(xij)), so that the number of participants
who can pool their shares to reconstruct the secret depends on their importance.
The following algorithm resumes the proposed construction of secret sharing scheme.
Algorithm 1 Construction of secret sharing scheme
Input:
(1) The set of company’s participants P = {Pij, i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , h};
(2) A prime power q;
(3) The polynomial f(x) = a0 + k1x+ · · · + khx
h.
Output: The set of shares assigned to participants S = {Sij, i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , h}.
1: For each participant Pij , calculate xim = 1 +mih, m = 1, . . . , j;
2: Calculate Sij = (i, j, (xi1, f(xi1)) , (xi2, f(xi2)) , . . . , (xij , f(xij))) , i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , h;
3: Return: S = {Sij , i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , h} .
According to Horner’s method, Algorithm 1 can be achieved, in the worst case, in O(nH) time
complexity.
3. The proposed reconstruction algorithm
Let K = (k1, . . . , kh) be the secret shared over the finite set of participants P by application of
Algorithm 1. According to the polynomial chosen by the dealer for calculating and distributing
the shares, a group of participantsX who want to collaborate with their shares in order to recover
the secret K, should in first reconstruct the polynomial f , which can be done by interpolation,
for that X should own at least h + 1 values of ordered pairs, (x1, f(x1)), . . . , (xh+1, f(xh+1)).
The secret K can be recover by applying the logical XOR operator on the ki’s deduced from f :
K = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ kh.
The proposed reconstruction is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Theorem 3.1. The constructed secret sharing scheme is perfect.
Proof. Let X be a qualified subset of participants, then the conditions (i) and (ii), in the
initialization phase 2.1 above, are satisfied. According to the decomposition phase 2.2, each Pij
belonging to X owns as much values of (x, f(x)) as his level j, (xi1, f(xi1)), . . . , (xij , f(xij)).
Thus, X owns at least h+1 values of (x, f(x)) and can recover f(x), by using interpolation, and
then the secret K by applying the logical XOR operator on the ki’s deduced from f . Therefore,
any qualified subset can reconstruct the secret.
Now, let X be an unqualified subset of participants, then one of the conditions (i) and (ii), in the
initialization phase 2.1, is not satisfied. If the condition (i) is not, X owns less than h+1 values
of (x, f(x)), which don’t allow the reconstruction of f(x). In the other hand, as the elements of
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X cannot all be at the same hierarchical level, if the condition (ii) is not satisfied, the system
denies access. Therefore, any unqualified subset has no information about the secret. 
Algorithm 2 Reconstruction of a secret K
Input:
(1) A subset of participants X ⊂ P ;
(2) The set of hierarchical levels, N1, . . . , Nh;
(3) The shares of participants belonging to X.
Output:
(1) The secret K = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ kh or
(2) The system denies access.
If X ∈ Γ Then Apply interpolation to reconstruct f(x) and then the secret K
Else The system denies access and displays ”The subset is not qualified”.
4. The efficiency of the proposed secret sharing scheme
To measure the efficiency of the proposed secret sharing scheme, we consider the information
rate ρ =
log
2
(|K|)
log
2
(|S|) , where S is the maximum share.
Theorem 4.1. The constructed secret sharing scheme is ideal.
Proof. The secret K = (k1, . . . , kh) is an h-dimensional vector such that each ki, i = 1 . . . , h, is
in GF (q). The ki’s length is then equal to log2(q). According to the decomposition phase 2.2,
each share Sij is represented by a vector of j+2 components, in which j components are private.
The maximum share S is the one corresponding to the first manager of the company which is
at the high level h, its length is then equal to h log2(q). Hence, ρ = 1. 
5. Security analysis
The two main security requirements in a secret sharing scheme are confidentiality and au-
thentication. Confidentiality is about ensuring that the information is only available to the
qualified subsets, while the authentication is intended to ensure that each participant trying to
collaborate in order to reconstruct the secret, is the one he claims to be.
In this paper, confidentiality has been demonstrated in Theorem 3.1 by proving that the pro-
posed secret sharing scheme is perfect, while authentication is ensured by denying the access of
all types of attacks. In fact, in such protocols, two types of attacks can arise: the insider and
outsider attacks.
For the outsider attacks, where the attackers are not belonging to the system, the attacker aims
to recover the secret by trying all possible combinations. As the secret K is an h-dimensional
vector in which each component is in GF (q), the number of possible combinations increases
according to the number of hierarchical levels h. Thus, the brute force attack becomes a com-
binatorial explosion.
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For the insider attacks, where the attackers are belonging to the system but consist on an un-
qualified subset of participants, as all parameters are public in the proposed scheme except the
secret K, three types of insider attacks can arise:
• The first case consists on participant in level Ni who may pretend to be a participant
of another lower level Nj , j < i, and use only a part of his share, in order to escape
the condition (ii) described in the initialization phase 2.1. The following conditions (iii)
and (iv) are then included in the proposed scheme and checked before proceeding to the
reconstruction algorithm 2. In the case where these conditions are not satisfied, the system
generates an authentication error and display an attack attempt message without executing
the reconstruction algorithm 2.
For each given share
Sij = (i, j, (xi1, f(xi1)) , (xi2, f(xi2)) , . . . , (xij, f(xij))) , i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , h,
(iii) The login i corresponds to a participant of the level j. This condition is formulated by:
∀Sij, i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , h; Pij ∈ Nj.
(iv) Each ordered pairs (xim, f(xim)), m = 1, . . . , j, corresponds to the one sent by the
dealer to the participant i belonging to the level j. This condition is expressed by:
∀Sij, i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , h; ∀xim, m = 1, . . . , j; xim = 1 (mod ih) and
⌊xim
ih
⌋
≤ j,
where ⌊.⌋ denotes the floor function.
• The second case of insider attacks consists on participants in the same level Ni, who are
not allow to collaborate with their shares, according to condition (ii), in Section 2.1, trying
to merge their shares to have only one and pretend to be a participant of another higher
level Nj, j > i. This case is treated as the first case described above.
• The last case of insider attacks consists on participant in level Ni, who may pretend to be
a participant of another higher level Nj , j > i, and try to calculate another value of f(x).
This case is similar to the outsider attacks described above.
6. Didactic example
Let consider the case of a company whose organization chart is represented by the tree T given
in Figure 1 above. According to the initialization phase 2.1:
• The number of hierarchical levels h = 3.
• The set of participants P = {P11, P21, P31, P41, P51, P61, P72, P82, P93}.
• According to their hierarchical levels, participants are assigned as follow:
N1 = {P11, P21, P31, P41, P51, P61};
N2 = {P72, P82};
N3 = {P93}.
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• The access structure Γ0 containing all the minimal qualified subsets is given as follow:
Γ0 ={{P93, P11}, {P93, P21}, {P93, P31}, {P93, P41}, {P93, P51}, {P93, P61}, {P93, P72},
{P93, P82}, {P82, P11, P21}, {P82, P11, P31}, {P82, P11, P41}, {P82, P11, P51}, {P82, P11, P61},
{P82, P21, P31}, {P82, P21, P41}, {P82, P21, P51}, {P82, P21, P61}, {P82, P31, P41},
{P82, P31, P51}, {P82, P31, P61}, {P82, P41, P51}, {P82, P41, P61}, {P82, P51, P61},
{P72, P11, P21}, {P72, P11, P31}, {P72, P11, P41}, {P72, P11, P51}, {P72, P11, P61},
{P72, P21, P31}, {P72, P21, P41}, {P72, P21, P51}, {P72, P21, P61}, {P72, P31, P41},
{P72, P31, P51}, {P72, P31, P61}, {P72, P41, P51}, {P72, P41, P61}, {P72, P51, P61}}
Suppose for instance that the keyK is 32-bit integer and q = 4294967311 a prime number greater
than 232 − 1. Based on the decomposition phase 2.2, let consider k1 = 4967295, k2 = 94967,
k3 = 9496729 and a0 = 429496. The polynomial chosen by the dealer is then
f(x) = 429496 + 4967295x + 94967x2 + 9496729x3 ,
and the shares given to participants are:
S93 = (9, 3, (x91, f(x91)), (x92, f(x92)), (x93, f(x93))) = (9, 3, (28, 2527731964), (55, 31222823), (82, 1673628957));
S72 = (7, 2, (x71, f(x71)), (x72, f(x72))) = (7, 2, (22, 2492596253), (43, 3826770342));
S82 = (8, 2, (x81, f(x81)), (x82, f(x82)) = (8, 2, (25, 2541468297), (49, 1061011979));
S11 = (1, 1, (x11, f(x11))) = (1, 1, (4, 629608804));
S21 = (2, 1, (x21, f(x21))) = (2, 1, (7, 3297231991));
S31 = (3, 1, (x31, f(x31))) = (3, 1, (10, 966393524));
S41 = (4, 1, (x41, f(x41))) = (4, 1, (13, 3765498123));
S51 = (5, 1, (x51, f(x51))) = (5, 1, (16, 348113953));
S61 = (6, 1, (x61, f(x61))) = (6, 1, (19, 842645734)).
It’s clear that each qualified subset belonging to Γ0 can recover the secret K.
Let’s take for instance the qualified subset X = {P82, P11, P21}. According to the reconstruction
Algorithm 3, the polynomial f can be reconstruct by applying interpolation.
The polynomial L defined bellow is the unique polynomial of degree at most h satisfying
L(xi) = yi = f(xi):
L(x) =
h∑
j=0
f(xj)lj(x), where lj(x) =
h∏
i=0
i6=j
(
x− xi
xj − xi
)
.
For the considered qualified subset X, the h known values of (x, f(x)) are: Lagrange polynomials
are calculated as follow:
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x0 = x81 = 25 f(x0) = 2541468297
x1 = x82 = 49 f(x1) = 1061011979
x2 = x11 = 4 f(x2) = 629608804
x3 = x21 = 7 f(x3) = 3297231991
Table 1. (x, f(x)) values of qualified subset.
l0(x) =
(x− 49)(x − 4)(x− 7)
(25 − 49)(25 − 4)(25 − 7)
=
1
9072
(
−x3 + 60x2 − 567x+ 1372
)
,
l1(x) =
(x− 25)(x − 4)(x− 7)
(49 − 25)(49 − 4)(49 − 7)
=
1
45360
(
x3 − 36x2 + 303x − 700
)
,
l2(x) =
(x− 25)(x− 49)(x − 7)
(4− 25)(4 − 49)(4 − 7)
=
1
2835
(
−x3 + 81x2 − 1743x + 8575
)
,
l3(x) =
(x− 25)(x− 49)(x − 4)
(7− 25)(7 − 49)(7 − 4)
=
1
2268
(
x3 − 78x2 + 1521x− 4900
)
.
Hence
L(x) = 2541468297 l0(x) + 1061011979 l1(x) + 629608804 l2(x) + 3297231991 l3(x) (mod q)
= f(x).
Therefore
Decimal value Binary value
k1 4967295 010010111100101101111111
k2 94967 000000010111001011110111
k3 9496729 100100001110100010011001
K = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3 14307601 110110100101000100010001
Table 2. Reconstruction of the secret K.
In case of insider attacks: as a first case of an insider attack, let’s take the case in which
the subset {P82, P72}, who is not qualified, try to reconstruct the secret by using the P82 share’s
as if it concerned those corresponding to participants P11 and P21. For instance, instead of
introducing the share S82 given above, P82 will introduce the following vectors S
′
11 and S
′
21 as
shares of P11 and P21, respectively:
S
′
11 = (1, 1, (x81 , f(x81))) = (1, 1, (25, 2541468297)),
S
′
21 = (1, 1, (x82 , f(x82))) = (2, 1, (49, 1061011979)).
The condition (iv), in Section 5, is not satisfied in this case, since:
x81 = 1 (mod 3), but
⌊x81
3
⌋
> 1,
x82 = 1 (mod 6), but
⌊x82
6
⌋
> 1.
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The system generates then an authentication error and display an attack attempt message.
As a second case of an insider attack, let’s take the case in which the subset {P11, P21, P31, P41},
who is not qualified, according to condition (ii), in Section 2.1, try to reconstruct the secret by
merging the shares of P31 and P41 and pretending to be the subset {P11, P21, P72} for instance.
In this case, instead of introducing the shares S31 and S41 given above, a merged share S
′
72 is
introduced as if it was the one corresponding to the participant P72:
S
′
72 = (7, 2, (x31, f(x31)), (x41, f(x41))) = (7, 2, (10, 966393524), (13, 3765498123)).
The condition (iv), in Section 5, is not satisfied in this case, since⌊x31
21
⌋
< 2, but x31 6= 1 (mod 21),⌊x41
21
⌋
< 2, but x41 6= 1 (mod 21).
The system generates then an authentication error and display an attack attempt message.
In case of outsider attacks: as all coefficients of f are taken in GF (q), the attackers should
try qh+1 possible combinations to reconstruct f . In our example, this requires 42949673114
possibilities, that exceeds 2116.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we first propose a novel construction of a secret sharing scheme, which is based
on the hierarchical concept of companies. In the proposed scheme, polynomials are used over
GF (q) and the considered access structure is not uniform, since the number of parts needed to
reconstruct the secret depends on the importance of the participants. We also present a recon-
struction algorithm, in which the interpolation and the logical XOR are used to reconstruct the
polynomial and recover the secret K, respectively. We show that the proposed scheme is perfect
and ideal. Furthermore, the security of the proposed scheme is analyzed by discussing all possi-
ble kinds of attacks (insider and outsider) and proofing that confidentiality and authentication
are ensured. Finally, we conclude by a detailed didactic example.
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